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INTRODUCTION 
Meet Kody Brown, an advertising salesman living happily in Utah 
with his four wives and 18 children.1 Apart from the fact that Kody has 
multiple wives, the Browns are an otherwise normal family. They take 
vacations, argue with one another, and share meals together at the end of 
a long day. Unfortunately for the Browns, local authorities began 
investigating them to determine whether they were in violation of the 
state’s criminal bigamy laws.2 Fearing for their safety, Kody moved his 
family to Nevada and filed suit against the state, claiming that the 
investigation violated his family’s right to privacy. At trial, the lower court 
ruled in favor of the Browns and struck down as unconstitutional the 
portion of the state’s bigamy statute that criminally implicated Kody for 
cohabiting3 with multiple wives.4 The appellate court, however, dismissed 
the case and effectively reinstated the statute that criminalized Kody and 
his family’s way of life.5 
TLC’s popular television series “Sister Wives,” which follows the 
Browns’ lives, has entertained millions of viewers over the course of seven 
seasons.6 What many viewers may not realize, however, are the legal issues 
raised by the show’s plot. The Utah district court’s ruling in favor of the 
Browns and striking down of the criminal portion of Utah’s bigamy statute 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2017, by MCLAURINE H. ZENTNER. 
 1. The following hypothetical described herein is based on the factual 
circumstances in the 2013 Utah state court decision of Brown v. Buhman. See 
generally Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
 2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2017); Bigamy, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[Bigamy is] [t]he act of marrying one person while 
legally married to another.”); see also Polygamy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 
(defining polygamy as “[t]he state or practice of having more than one spouse 
simultaneously”). 
 3. Cohabitation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (“[Cohabitation is] [t]he fact, 
state, or condition of living together, esp[ecially] as partners in life, usu[ally] with 
the suggestion of sexual relations.”). 
 4. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–23. 
 5. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016). The court 
justified its dismissal of the case by concluding that because Utah prosecutors had a 
policy of not pursuing most bigamy cases, the plaintiffs had no credible fear of future 
prosecution and thus lacked standing. Id. at 1167; see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 6. See Michael Rothman, “Sister Wives”: Everything You Need to Know About 
Kody Brown and Family, ABC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Enter 
tainment/kody-brown-sister-wives/story?id=38331357 (providing background of the 
Brown family and discussing the purpose and plot of the show) [https://perma.cc 
/HS38-9QVA]. 
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was vacated recently by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on procedural 
grounds.7 The Tenth Circuit’s decision, along with the recent United States 
Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges prohibiting states from 
banning same-sex marriages,8 has intensified a new and controversial debate 
concerning the legality of anti-bigamy laws. A central issue debated concerns 
whether marriage should be restricted to relationships consisting of only two 
individuals, thus denying marriage rights to individuals, such as Kody and 
his family, who are in bigamous unions. 
Perhaps the most controversial matter surrounding the constitutionality 
of bigamous marriage is whether states should recognize the practice legally 
and confer governmental benefits to individuals in these unions. A major 
concern surrounding the legal recognition of bigamous marriage is the effect 
such recognition would have on tax and community property laws—two 
areas of law shaped by the concept of marriage as a legal union between two 
individuals. A United States Supreme Court decision requiring states to 
recognize bigamous marriage as a legal institution would disrupt tax and 
community property laws significantly throughout the United States.9 The 
issue of bigamous marriage is particularly relevant to Louisiana—not only 
because Louisiana is a community property state10 but also because of 
Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute.11 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the United States 
Supreme Court’s recent expansion of individual rights and liberties and 
the significant ambiguities surrounding the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Part II analyzes Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute and the 
issues surrounding the bigamous marriage debate generally. Part III 
conducts a constitutional analysis of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute 
and highlights the central issues the statute raises. Lastly, Part IV proposes 
that the Louisiana Supreme Court, if confronted with the constitutionality 
of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute, should decline to extend the 
fundamental right to marry to bigamous unions under a rational basis 
review. Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court should hold the portion of 
the statute criminalizing bigamous marriage unconstitutional in light of 
                                                                                                             
 7. Brown, 822 F.3d at 1179; see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 9. See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 113, 117 (2013). 
 10. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2338 (2017). The question of legally recognizing 
bigamous marriage presents a significant challenge to community property states that 
treat marriage as an institution consisting of only two people. See, e.g., Hadar Aviram 
& Gwendolyn Leachman, The Future of Polyamorous Marriage: Lessons from the 
Marriage Equality Struggle, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 269, 318 (2015). 
 11. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:76 (2017). 
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Lawrence v. Texas12 and the greater privacy rights that Louisiana citizens 
enjoy under the state constitution.13 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROGRESSION TOWARD THE BIGAMY DEBATE 
Marriage is one of the most profound and important institutions in 
American society, and many people consider marriage to be the most 
significant moment an individual can experience during one’s life.14 
Marriage also is a unique institution because of its nationwide recognition 
as a contract formed between the spouses and the government.15 The legal 
aspect of marriage seems rather peculiar in light of the particularly 
intimate and private nature associated with the institution of marriage. 
Marriage offers the opportunity for two people to join together in a 
single union composed of love, fidelity, and spirituality.16 The government 
also benefits from this arrangement because marriage can be an effective 
mechanism to facilitate child-rearing in stable family environments—the 
building blocks of a strong and productive society.17 The government’s 
extensive role in regulating marriage, however, raises the question of how far 
regulations should extend when individual rights and liberties are concerned. 
An examination of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
individual rights and liberties and the extent to which they are protected by 
the United States Constitution highlights the significance concerning the issue 
of governmental regulation of bigamous relationships. 
                                                                                                             
 12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. LA CONST. art. I, § 5; see also S. Con. Res. 39, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 
1997). Former Supreme Court Justice Byron White famously stated, “The 
[Supreme] Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals 
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 
(1986). It is with this idea in mind that this Comment approaches its analysis of 
bigamous marriage. 
 14. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“The centrality 
of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has 
existed for millennia and across civilizations. Since the dawn of history, marriage has 
transformed strangers into relatives, binding families and societies together.”). 
 15. See EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, MARRIAGE: HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING 
MYSTERY 388 (1965) (explaining that the contractual nature of marriage came from 
the Roman consensus idea of marriage). 
 16. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than 
marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and 
family.”). 
 17. See id. at 2600; see also, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 
(1923). 
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A. Introduction to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is one 
of the most significant constitutional amendments because it safeguards 
fundamental individual rights and mandates equal protection of the laws.18 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment contains both the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.19 The Due Process Clause 
declares that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”20 Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause 
mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”21 Together, these two clauses form one of 
the most heavily litigated sections of the United States Constitution.22 The 
high volume of litigation is primarily a result of the Supreme Court’s 
ambiguous interpretation of the overlap between these two clauses.23 
The United States Supreme Court has relied on the Due Process Clause 
to recognize independent substantive and procedural requirements that state 
laws must observe.24 The Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
often concerns the “fundamental rights” of individuals that the Court deems 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”25 When deciding whether a right 
is “fundamental,” the Court examines whether the right is “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.”26 If a court deems the right fundamental, 
then it applies “strict scrutiny” analysis under which the government must 
                                                                                                             
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 19. Id. § 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Reservoir of 
Congressional Power?, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 854 (1933). 
 23. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 24. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
569 (5th ed. 2015). 
 25. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 26. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines 
but rather from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history (and), solid recognition of 
the basic values that underlie our society.’”). This analysis by the Court primarily 
concerns rights not mentioned expressly in the text of the Constitution, unlike other 
fundamental rights, such as the right to trial by jury and the Fourth Amendment’s 
safeguard from unreasonable searches and seizures. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
24, at 826. 
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demonstrate a compelling state interest27 that is advanced by a narrowly 
tailored law that infringes upon the right at issue.28 Strict scrutiny analysis 
is the most stringent judicial standard of review and ordinarily results in a 
court striking down the law in question.29 If a court determines that the law 
under review does not implicate or infringe upon a fundamental right, then 
“rational basis” review applies, which requires the government to show only 
that the law in question rationally relates to some legitimate state interest.30 
Comparatively, the rational basis test is the least stringent standard of review 
and ordinarily results in the court upholding the law.31 
Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause largely in response to widespread discrimination against former 
slaves after the Civil War.32 The Equal Protection Clause mandates that all 
persons in similar capacities be treated equally under the law.33 In an equal 
protection analysis, courts focus on whether a sufficient governmental 
interest exists to justify the discriminatory effect of the law at issue on a 
certain class of people.34 The two primary ways in which a law can be held 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause is if the court finds that the 
                                                                                                             
 27. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (“Under 
strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted purpose must 
be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 29. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 567. 
 30. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
 31. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 565–66. An additional level of 
scrutiny that courts sometimes apply is the middle tier of review known as 
“intermediate scrutiny.” Id. Under this standard of review, which is slightly more 
stringent than rational basis but slightly less stringent than strict scrutiny, a law will be 
upheld as long as it is substantially related to an important governmental purpose. See 
id.; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983). Although intermediate 
scrutiny is applied in various contexts, such as laws involving gender discrimination 
and regulation of commercial speech, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), rational basis and strict scrutiny 
are the only levels of scrutiny at issue in this Comment.  
 32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 695. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 34. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942). Additionally, the 
levels of scrutiny that apply to an analysis under due process also apply to an 
analysis under equal protection. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 567. 
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law in question implicates a “suspect class,”35 such as race,36 or if the law 
discriminates against a non-suspect class but nevertheless burdens a 
fundamental right.37 The latter scenario, which implicates the overlap of both 
due process and equal protection, marks the point when an analysis under the 
Fourteenth Amendment becomes especially complex due to the Court’s 
failure in recent decisions to specify the appropriate levels of scrutiny for 
analyzing individual rights.38 
B. A Clausal Collision: The Ambiguities in Fourteenth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
American society has defied social injustice throughout its history and its 
legal regime has evolved, albeit gradually, to incorporate new rights and 
freedoms for all its citizens.39 In the past 50 years alone, the United States 
Supreme Court has facilitated a significant expansion of social liberties, 
especially within the realm of individual rights and liberties.40 Today, United 
States citizens have the constitutional rights to privacy and to marry any 
individual, regardless of race, social status, or sexual orientation.41 The 
expansion of social liberties is especially significant in relation to bigamous 
marriage because the expansion highlights the two interrelated constitutional 
issues central to this debate: the right to privacy and the right to marry. 
1. The Right to Privacy 
Although the United States Constitution does not provide explicitly 
for a right to privacy, the Supreme Court has affirmed repeatedly an 
individual right to freedom from unwarranted intrusion or exposure in 
                                                                                                             
 35. In determining whether a class warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny 
under the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court considers history of 
discrimination, political powerlessness, immutability of the characteristic, and the 
relation between the characteristic and the ability of the group to perform or 
contribute to society. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973). 
 36. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 698. 
 37. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
 38. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 822. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 695–96. 
 40. See, e.g., id.  
 41. See, e.g., id. at 696. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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one’s private and intimate affairs.42 In particular, the Court has analyzed 
this right frequently in the context of marriage.43 
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut invalidated a 
law that criminalized the use of contraceptives as violating the marital 
“right to privacy,”44 finding the right protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.45 Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
the Court held a Massachusetts state law unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for preventing unmarried 
couples from accessing contraceptives.46 The Court reasoned that the law 
resulted in impermissible discrimination by denying the right to possess 
contraceptives to unmarried couples.47 
In 2003, the Court promulgated the momentous decision of Lawrence 
v. Texas, a case that involved a controversial Texas criminal law that 
classified consensual homosexual intercourse as illegal sodomy.48 The 
case arose after Texas police arrested two men for engaging in sexual 
intercourse and later fined them under a Texas criminal law that prohibited 
“deviant sexual intercourse”—defined under the law as sexual activity 
between same-sex individuals.49 The Court struck down the law as 
unconstitutional and held that an individual has a right to engage in 
intimate and consensual sexual conduct under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.50 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia heavily 
criticized Justice Kennedy’s holding in the majority opinion as ambiguous 
for failing to articulate the applicable level of scrutiny.51 Furthermore, the 
Court did not define the right to privacy as “fundamental” or mention strict 
scrutiny in the opinion.52 Although the holding in Lawrence concerned a 
                                                                                                             
 42. Right of privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 43. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 44. Id. at 485–86 (emphasizing that the idea of allowing police “to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives . . . 
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship”). 
 45. See id. at 485. 
 46. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972). 
 47. Id. at 452. 
 48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
 49. Id. at 563. 
 50. Id. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that 
is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this choice.”). 
 51. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882. 
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statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy,53 many scholars believe that 
the broader impact of this decision was the Court’s implied recognition of 
a “fundamental right to privacy.”54 The Lawrence decision set the stage 
for later Supreme Court decisions that would expand individual civil 
liberties further, particularly the right to marry.55 
2. The Right to Marry 
Although marriage is not defined in the United States Constitution, the 
judicial understanding of this institution has evolved throughout the 
nation’s history.56 The Supreme Court first recognized marriage as a 
fundamental right in the groundbreaking decision of Loving v. Virginia.57 
In Loving, the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited 
a white person from marrying another person of a different race.58 The 
first part of the Court’s opinion explained why the law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the 
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”59 The Court held that the 
law deprived the Lovings, the interracial couple prosecuted in Virginia for 
violating its anti-miscegenation law, of their constitutionally protected 
liberty without due process of law.60 
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin law that 
prevented noncustodial parents, if they were required to pay child support 
to a minor not in their custody, from marrying without first obtaining 
permission from a court.61 Although the Court accepted the state’s claim 
that it had a substantial interest in ensuring that noncustodial parents paid 
child support, the Court concluded that the law was not related sufficiently 
                                                                                                             
 53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 881; see also Casey E. Faucon, Polygamy 
after Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 
499–500 (2015) (“[T]he Lawrence decision expanded upon the scope of Due Process 
to include sexual conduct beyond the marital relationship, allowing the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions.”). 
 55. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 56. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613–16 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (discussing the 
aspects of marriage that have changed over time). 
 57. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 1 (1967). 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 12. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978). 
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to that end.62 Thus, the Court held that the law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because it impermissibly interfered with the right to marry.63 
In United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down as unconstitutional 
a portion of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) for denying 
equal protection to homosexual individuals.64 Under DOMA, federal law 
defined marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman.65 The 
Court emphasized that there was “no legitimate purpose” served by the federal 
government’s refusal to recognize marriages that a state acknowledged under 
its laws.66 In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy declared DOMA 
unconstitutional but, again, failed to specify which level of scrutiny 
applied67 and did not address whether the law impermissibly infringed 
upon the fundamental right to marry.68 
It was not until 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Court recognized 
that the fundamental right to marry applied equally to same-sex couples.69 
In Obergefell, the Court declined to frame the purported right at issue as 
whether a fundamental right to same-sex marriage existed.70 Instead, the 
Court asked the broader question of whether the fundamental right to 
                                                                                                             
 62. Id. at 390–91. The Court determined that because the law at issue triggered 
a “strict scrutiny” analysis for interfering with the exercise of the fundamental right 
to marry, the state not only was required to show a sufficiently important state 
interest justifying the law but also that the law was tailored closely to meet that 
interest. Id. at 388. Thus, although the state satisfied its first burden under a strict 
scrutiny analysis in proffering a sufficient state interest, it failed to show that the 
law was sufficiently tailored to meet that interest. Id. at 390–91.  
 63. Id. at 388. 
 64. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 65. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 66. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 67. See id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). An important 
caveat that the Court made clear in its opinion in Obergefell was that its holding 
was not intended to interfere with the fundamental rights protected under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 2607. In other words, only the states are bound by the ruling 
in Obergefell, rather than religious organizations and persons who oppose same-
sex marriage because of their beliefs, whether religiously motivated or not. Id. 
(“The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given 
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so 
central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the 
family structure they have long revered.”). 
 70. Id. at 2602. 
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marry also applied to same-sex couples.71 Thus, Obergefell is significant for 
recognizing the legality of same-sex marriages and for the Court’s ambiguous 
opinion that confused the doctrines of due process and equal protection 
without explaining how each doctrine applied to the facts at hand.72 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy declined to follow the traditional 
fundamental rights analysis ordinarily applied by the Court, choosing instead 
to list four distinct reasons as to why the fundamental right to marry also 
applies to same-sex couples.73 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts 
criticized Justice Kennedy’s “test” for contradicting the fundamental rights 
analysis used by the Court in prior decisions.74 Under the traditional 
fundamental rights analysis, the Court asks whether the purported right at 
issue is “fundamental to this Nation’s history and tradition of ordered 
liberty.”75 In the majority opinion, however, Justice Kennedy explained that 
marriage is fundamental to society under the Constitution because it: (1) “is 
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”; (2) “supports a two-person 
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals”; (3) 
“safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related 
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”; and (4) “is a keystone of 
our social order.”76 Justice Kennedy concluded that these core functions of 
marriage equally applied to same-sex couples; in other words, same-sex 
couples, like heterosexual couples, were “similarly situated” in regards to 
the fundamental right of marriage.77 Justice Kennedy’s inability to adhere 
to the traditional fundamental rights analysis marked the point when he 
essentially combined the doctrines of due process and equal protection; 
although Justice Kennedy raised due process concerns by focusing on the 
right to marry, he posed the question of his analysis through an equal 
protection framework.78 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for this broad 
framing of the right at issue, arguing that “[o]ur precedents have accordingly insisted 
that judges ‘exercise the utmost care’ in identifying implied fundamental rights, ‘lest 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the Members of this Court.’” Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) 
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). 
 72. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 73. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589–90. 
 74. Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 75. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 672. 
 76. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–601. 
 77. Id. at 2599. 
 78. See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Obergefell v. Hodges: Framing 
Fundamental Rights, SSRN (June 29, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2624725 
[https://perma.cc/5D7E-SPBV]. 
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The muddled overlap between the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines 
of due process and equal protection is the consequence of vague reasoning 
rendered by the Court in the last few decades.79 The ambiguity of the 
Supreme Court’s opinions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment doctrines 
has been exacerbated by the Court’s recent opinions that fail to articulate 
the levels of scrutiny used when analyzing purported rights and liberties.80 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM OF PLURAL UNIONS 
This section first provides context to the United States Supreme 
Court’s initial interpretation of the practice of bigamy in addition to recent 
interpretations by the lower courts. Second, this section conducts a cursory 
analysis of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute to highlight the two 
primary issues addressed in this Comment: whether the government has a 
constitutional basis for criminally charging individuals in bigamous 
unions and whether the government can decline to grant legal recognition 
to those unions. Lastly, this section addresses the potential ramifications 
of legally recognizing bigamous marriage, particularly in terms of its 
potential impact on Louisiana’s matrimonial regime. 
A. Bigamy and Reynolds v. United States 
Because the recent United States Supreme Court decisions expand 
upon the right to privacy and the right to marry,81 an important debate has 
emerged regarding how these decisions should impact bigamous unions. 
Bigamy is a practice that has remained illegal in all 50 states since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. United States,82 which has yet to 
be overruled.83 In Reynolds, the Court upheld the validity of laws banning 
bigamy under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.84 The 
Court justified its decision to ban bigamous marriages by articulating that, 
                                                                                                             
 79. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 80. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 81. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 82. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 83. See State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742 (Utah 2006) (arguing that Reynolds 
remains valid precedent because the courts have continued to cite to it with 
approval in modern Free Exercise cases). 
 84. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 149. The Court previously has elaborated on the 
distinction between religious beliefs and religiously motivated conduct, stating that 
the Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot 
be.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). 
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although religious beliefs are protected from governmental interference, the 
same conclusion is not true for religious practices that harm the public order of 
society.85 
A recent decision by a federal district court in Utah, however, addressed the 
constitutionality of Utah’s criminal bigamy statute.86 Rather than confront 
whether states can deny legal recognition to bigamous unions as a form of 
marriage, the court instead held the statute unconstitutional for criminalizing 
cohabitation, a private activity the court deemed protected under the Due 
Process Clause.87 The Tenth Circuit, however, recently vacated the district 
court’s decision on procedural grounds without a discussion of the merits,88 
further intensifying the debate surrounding this controversial issue. Adding fuel 
to this debate is the constitutional uncertainty of Louisiana’s bigamy statute, 
which contains similar elements as the Utah statute that was struck down 
initially in the Buhman decision.89 
B. The Problem with Louisiana’s Criminal Bigamy Statute 
Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute defines bigamy as “the marriage to 
another person by a person already married, and having a husband or wife 
living, or the habitual cohabitation, in [Louisiana], with such second husband 
or wife, regardless of the place where the marriage was celebrated.”90 This 
statute, though similar to Utah’s bigamy statute, is distinguishable because the 
Utah statute defines bigamy as the act of “purporting91 to marry” and 
cohabiting with another person when one of the parties is currently married.92 
Despite containing similar “cohabitation” language, the Louisiana statute is 
narrower in scope because it applies only to individuals who marry another 
person while in an existing marriage.93 Nevertheless, the Louisiana statute 
does not discriminate as to the location of where the marriage was 
performed;94 therefore, individuals who have more than one spouse and move 
to Louisiana from another state or country are susceptible to criminal liability 
under this statute. Thus, the two main questions for this analysis are whether 
                                                                                                             
 85. See generally Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 86. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
 87. See id. at 1202; see also supra note 2.  
 88. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); see also supra note 5. 
 89. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 90. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:76 (2017). 
 91. Purport, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that to 
purport is to “profess or claim, esp[ecially] falsely”). 
 92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2017). 
 93. See § 14:76. 
 94. Id. 
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the government may criminalize the practice of bigamy and, if not, then 
whether bigamous unions also should be recognized as a legal form of 
marriage. 
Although the broader issue confronted in this Comment concerns the 
constitutionality of laws denying legal recognition to bigamous unions, the 
criminal nature of bigamy laws, like Louisiana’s bigamy statute, is crucial 
to address in light of the Lawrence decision.95 Laws criminalizing bigamy 
raise serious concerns not only because of the constitutional uncertainty of 
the laws but also because they present the opportunity for state authorities 
to target minorities or other groups of individuals in a potentially 
unconstitutional way.96 
The Louisiana Supreme Court, if given the opportunity, should 
address the constitutionality of both the criminal nature of Louisiana’s 
bigamy statute and the broader issue of whether it is constitutional for 
Louisiana to continue denying legal recognition to these unions. When a 
court decides a case without discussing the merits at issue, as the Tenth 
Circuit did in the Buhman decision,97 it creates a muddled precedent for 
other courts to follow and leaves individuals uncertain as to the full scope 
of their rights as law-abiding citizens. 
C. The Question and Implications of Legalizing Bigamous Unions 
The constitutional question of legalizing bigamous unions has two far-
reaching implications. First, the bigamous marriage debate highlights the 
complex ambiguity that plagues current Supreme Court jurisprudence 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and the uncertain future of due 
process and equal protection.98 Furthermore, this debate raises the issue of 
how bigamous unions can be incorporated into the current American legal 
system. 
                                                                                                             
 95. Samantha Slark, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement 
on the Liberty Interests of Consenting Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 456 (2004). 
 96. See, e.g., Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana House Votes 27-67 to Keep 
Unconstitutional Anti-Sodomy Law on the Books, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/04/post_558.html [https://perma.cc/NV 
R8-32S4]; Aaron Looney, Deputies arrest man for bigamy, LIVINGSTON PARISH 
NEWS (May 30, 2004), http://www.livingstonparishnews.com/news/deputies-arrest-
man-for-bigamy/article_b0317bd4-7676-59fd-8db3-856f1d116b65.html [https://per 
ma.cc /6L98-57VG]; see generally Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: 
Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 
(2010). 
 97. See Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 98. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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1. Uncertainty After Obergefell 
Regarding the constitutional question of bigamous unions, several legal 
scholars have proposed various ways in which the legal right to bigamy can 
fit within a constitutional framework.99 Much of the legal scholarship 
concerning this issue, however, remains uncertain as to how the legalization 
of bigamy could be achieved or whether such a framework exists at all. Some 
scholars suggest that bigamous unions can obtain legal recognition under due 
process100 while others believe that equal protection, especially after Windsor, 
provides the clearest path.101 Finally, the Obergefell decision suggests that the 
legal recognition of bigamy may be achieved through a combination of both 
due process and equal protection reasoning.102 These various proposals 
emphasize the ambiguity plaguing this constitutional debate.  
Obergefell is not the only vague Supreme Court decision that has 
interpreted the scope of individual rights; the Lawrence and Windsor 
holdings also declined to specify a scrutiny standard.103 The Lawrence and 
Windsor decisions, however, primarily addressed the right at issue under 
                                                                                                             
 99. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 309; Faucon, supra note 
54, at 476. 
 100. Cassiah M. Ward, I Now Pronounce You Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. 
Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 131, 142 (2004) (suggesting that advocates of plural marriage might 
argue that a due process right to engage in this practice resulted from the right to 
sexual privacy created in Lawrence); Michael G. Myers, Polygamist Eye for the 
Monogamist Guy: Homosexual Sodomy...Gay Marriage...Is Polygamy Next?, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 1451, 1471–74 (2006). But see Hema Chatlani, In Defense of 
Marriage: Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Lead Us Down a Slippery Slope Toward 
the Legalization of Polygamy, 6 APPALACHIAN J.L. 101, 128–32 (2006) (arguing that 
polygamy differs too much in structure and content from same-sex marriage to support 
any colorable legal analogy). 
 101. See, e.g., Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for 
a Constitutional Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2021–24 (2015); 
see also Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 309 (arguing that a sexual 
orientation classification could trigger a strict scrutiny standard or a heightened 
standard of scrutiny). 
 102. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These considerations 
lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty 
of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right 
and that liberty.”) (emphasis added); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). 
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either due process or equal protection grounds—but not both.104 In 
Obergefell, on the other hand, the Court combined the two doctrines without 
explaining its analysis under either of the two clauses.105  
2. The Potential Impact of Legalizing Bigamous Unions 
In addition to the significant ambiguities regarding the constitutionality 
of bigamous marriage, another concern is how the practice can be 
incorporated into the current American legal system. The major issue with 
this proposal concerns the potential effect that legalizing bigamous marriage 
would have on areas of law that regard marriage as a relationship between 
two individuals.106 Specifically, this Comment focuses on the potential 
impact bigamous marriage would have on tax and community property law. 
United States tax law likely would be affected most by the legalization 
of bigamous marriage because of the federal joint-filing income tax system 
that distinguishes between married and unmarried couples for tax rate 
purposes.107 Because United States tax law is already wrought with 
complexity,108 it is alarming that this potential issue largely has been 
ignored by scholars in the bigamous marriage debate.109 The United States 
Internal Revenue Code in its current form is wholly ill-equipped to 
incorporate bigamous marriage unless the law undergoes significant and 
necessary revisions.110 
The incorporation of bigamous marriage into the American legal system 
also will impact community property laws significantly. Although there are 
only nine community property states,111 the number includes Texas and 
                                                                                                             
 104. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government.”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 at 2680 (“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of 
persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). 
 105. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05; see also discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 106. See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 318. 
 107. 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (2012); see, e.g., id. 
 108. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 9, at 125 (citing Samuel A. Donaldson, The 
Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 682–83 (2003)). 
 109. See, e.g., id. at 115 (“[A]side from a glancing mention of tax evasion, no 
scholarship has analyzed the tax environment polygamists face.”). 
 110. Id. at 168. 
 111. Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 33, 72 (2010).  
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California, two of the most heavily populated states in the country.112 Thus, 
the legalization of bigamous unions potentially would impact a large number 
of citizens in the United States. Unlike the states that adopted the common 
law marriage regime, community property states recognize that the assets 
obtained after the marriage has come into existence are owned equally by the 
spouses.113 The legalization of bigamous marriage would have serious 
implications for community property law because, similar to United States tax 
law, community property law treats marriage as a union between two 
individuals.114 Allowing marriage to be a union between more than two 
people significantly complicates the structural bounds of community property 
law115 because it is unclear how the rules governing divorce and the division 
of marital assets would apply to relationships unlimited in number or form. 
III. DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF MARRIAGE  
This Comment performs a constitutional analysis of bigamous unions 
to determine the proper level of scrutiny that should apply if a court were 
to address this issue. Additionally, this analysis will determine if a 
sufficient governmental interest in criminalizing and declining recognition 
to these unions exists. 
A. Defining the Proper Scrutiny Standard 
To consider fully the constitutional implications of Louisiana’s 
criminal bigamy statute, Louisiana courts must determine the proper level 
of scrutiny that should apply when analyzing two central questions. The 
first issue raised by Louisiana’s bigamy statute is whether the state 
                                                                                                             
 112. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION OF THE 50 STATES, THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND PUERTO RICO (2000), https://www.census.gov/pop 
ulation/www/cen2000/maps/respop.html [https://perma.cc/AF5H-KP6E]. 
 113. See, e.g., Caroline B. Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of 
the Community Property System, Why California Adopted It, and Why Community 
Property Principles Benefit Women, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 
1, 6–7 (2011) (“[C]ommunity property is not something that spouses voluntarily 
agree to by contract. Instead, this civil law system of marital property law 
automatically springs into being when a couple gets married.”); see also Paul Due, 
Origin and Historical Development of the Community Property System, 25 LA. L. 
REV. 78, 78 (1964). 
 114. Davis, supra note 96, at 1990.  
 115. Relatedly, the legalization of bigamous marriage potentially will impact 
the rules of inheritance laws and their effects upon the termination of marriage. 
See, e.g., Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 275. 
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constitution prohibits the government from imposing criminal penalties on 
individuals engaged in the practice of bigamy. If it is unconstitutional for 
the government to criminalize bigamy, the second issue is whether the 
government can continue to deny legal recognition to this practice. 
1. The Level of Scrutiny for Criminalizing Bigamous Unions 
The Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas offers the most 
helpful guidance for a constitutional analysis of laws criminalizing 
bigamous unions because of the broad privacy interests articulated by the 
Court in its finding of a fundamental right to privacy.116 Furthermore, the 
Court seemed to suggest that it no longer would uphold laws that rely on 
moral reasons for their justification;117 thus, the Lawrence decision 
potentially marks the end of any legislation “restricting liberties solely based 
on a majoritarian perception of morality.”118 The Lawrence court, however, 
reached a narrow holding on the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy.119 Nevertheless, Lawrence should require the 
decriminalization of bigamy because the decision supports the notion that 
the right to privacy protects the personal and intimate relations of 
individuals from governmental intrusion.120 
Justice Kennedy’s rationale in Lawrence raises an important question: 
is the right to privacy broad enough to include the right of individuals to 
practice bigamy without the fear of criminal punishment? 121 Although the 
opinion was relatively ambiguous regarding the level of scrutiny applied in its 
analysis,122 the Lawrence decision did more than invalidate laws prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy; the decision set forth a powerful affirmation by the 
Supreme Court of a right to privacy under the Constitution.123 Moreover, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence emphasized that the Court has 
                                                                                                             
 116. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 117. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. 
TEXAS (Norton 2012); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
 118. Faucon, supra note 54, at 499. 
 119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
 120. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 788. 
 121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 122. See id. at 578; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882 (“Nowhere did 
the Court [in Lawrence] speak of a fundamental right or mention strict scrutiny. On the 
other hand, the Court did rely on privacy cases where strict scrutiny had been used.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65. 
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safeguarded privacy for almost a century in decisions involving family 
autonomy, contraception, and abortion.124 Nowhere in the opinion, however, 
did Justice Kennedy explain the level of scrutiny applied in his analysis.125 
Justice Kennedy seemed to suggest that the statute infringed a fundamental 
right but only used the language “legitimate basis,”126 implying that he 
applied a rational basis standard.127 After Lawrence, however, laws justified 
on moralistic grounds that prohibit private and intimate activity likely will fail 
to pass a judicial analysis under the rational basis test. 
Lawrence v. Texas is an important decision in the context of laws 
criminalizing bigamy because of the similarities between bigamy and the 
intimate activity protected by the Lawrence Court’s holding.128 For the 
same reasons that marriage and sexual activity are related, bigamy and sexual 
activity are related in ways as well, despite being separate concepts, because 
they are both private activities that benefit the parties involved. What becomes 
crucial in applying the rationale in Lawrence to the practice of bigamy is how 
the purported “right” is framed.129 In Lawrence, the majority opinion declined 
to frame the intimate activity as a “right to homosexual sodomy.”130 Instead, 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. at 564–66 (first citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); 
then citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and then citing Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 879. Many scholars have noted the 
absence of any discussion in Lawrence regarding the levels of scrutiny traditionally 
applied by the Court in a constitutional analysis. See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s 
Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 765, 782 (2013) (“It is therefore especially striking that Lawrence, a 
case about both liberty and equality, declined to identify a tier of scrutiny at all.”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, 
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 46 (2003) (explaining that much of the opacity 
in Lawrence stems from the Court’s failure to identify a level of scrutiny). 
 126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 127. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 882. In Romer v. Evans, a precursory 
decision to Lawrence, the Supreme Court was confronted with a Colorado initiative 
that had the effect of encouraging discrimination against homosexual individuals. 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
held that because the only purpose behind the law was animosity toward gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals, the law failed even the rational basis test. Id. at 634. 
 128. Faucon, supra note 54, at 499 (“The holding and language of Lawrence 
also do much in overruling the negative implications of Reynolds on marriage and 
alternative lifestyles in the constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
 129. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on 
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1161, 1173 (1988). 
 130. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
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Justice Kennedy spoke of the constitutional protection for all individuals in “the 
most intimate and private aspects of their lives.”131 Justice Kennedy clarified 
this distinction in how the right is framed when he explained that to define 
narrowly the right in Lawrence as “simply the right to engage in certain sexual 
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean 
a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have 
sexual intercourse.”132 Although individuals in bigamous unions should not be 
entitled to have their relationships recognized as a legal form of marriage,133 
they should be allowed the right to define their relationships because “these 
liberties extend to personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”134 Thus, if 
confronted with the constitutionality of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis135 and hold that 
the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause protects an individual’s right 
to practice bigamy free of criminal liability. 
2. The Level of Scrutiny for Denying Legal Recognition to Bigamous 
Unions 
The proper scrutiny standard for the issue of legalizing bigamous 
unions is best determined through an analysis under both equal protection 
and due process. This approach is necessary because of the convoluted 
overlap between the two doctrines in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence136 
and the uncertainty as to how this overlap affects the determination of the 
proper standard of scrutiny for future rights, such as the legal practice of 
bigamy. 
                                                                                                             
 131. Id. at 574. 
 132. Id. at 558. 
 133. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 134. William Duncan, Transforming the Right to Privacy, THE FAMILY IN 
AMERICA 371, 382 (2015) (describing the “self-definition” conception of the right to 
privacy). 
 135. Because Justice Kennedy failed to explain the level of scrutiny applied in 
Lawrence, the Louisiana Supreme Court should provide explicitly that because 
Louisiana’s bigamy statute infringes upon a fundamental right—the right to 
privacy—strict scrutiny therefore must apply to its constitutional analysis of the 
statute. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 136. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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a. Analysis Under Equal Protection 
One potential legal avenue for recognizing bigamous unions as a right 
warranting strict scrutiny is through an analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause.137 In this context, the legalization of bigamous marriage might occur 
through an argument based on sexual orientation as a suspect classification,138 
an idea recently implied but not expressly stated by the Supreme Court in 
Windsor.139 The problem with this approach, however, is that sexual 
orientation has not been designated as a suspect classification deserving of 
strict scrutiny140 because, similar to the Court’s approach in the fundamental 
rights arena, the Court is hesitant to define new classifications that warrant an 
almost insurmountable standard for the government to defeat.141 If the Court 
declined to define sexual orientation as a suspect classification, it is unlikely 
that individuals in bigamous unions will be granted suspect classification 
status either. The Court has not introduced a new suspect class under the Equal 
Protection Clause since it invalidated racially discriminatory legislation142 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Ann E. Tweedy, Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1461, 1476 (2011). 
 138. Id. According to two scholars, some polygamists feel that “being 
polyamorous is a fundamental part of their self-definition, regardless of their 
relationship structure at any given time, to the extent that they report that efforts to 
be monogamous feel unnatural to them.” Aviram & Leachman, supra note 10, at 
313. It is certainly questionable, however, whether a court would consider polygamy 
as a sexual orientation. See id. at 314; Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014) (explaining sexual-orientation discrimination as “discrimination 
based on a person’s predisposition or inclination to be romantically or sexually 
attracted to a certain type of person (i.e., heterosexuality, homosexuality, 
bisexuality, or asexuality), or based on a person’s gender identity (i.e., a person’s 
internal sense of gender)”). 
 139. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
 140. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 699. 
 141. Id. The Court may be hesitant to define new suspect classifications 
because of the potential danger in preventing the government from enforcing its 
laws. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 142. In fact, the Court last addressed bigamy in its Reynolds opinion when it 
upheld the constitutionality of laws banning bigamy, a decision that allegedly 
contained racial motivations itself. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 
(1878) (“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations 
of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost 
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, 
the second marriage was always void, and from the earliest history of England 
polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.”); see also Faucon, supra 
note 54, at 480. 
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from the Civil Rights Era. Consequently, many scholars doubt whether the 
Supreme Court will recognize another suspect class anytime soon.143  
Nevertheless, Windsor is significant because it is one of the more recent 
decisions by the Court to examine sexual orientation as a social classification.144 
In Windsor, however, the Court neither specified which scrutiny it applied nor 
addressed whether the law violated the fundamental right to marry.145 Thus, 
Windsor’s effect on the debate regarding the constitutionality of bigamous 
marriage is uncertain. Although Windsor’s effect on the bigamy question 
remains unclear, the opinion’s ambiguous holding remains significant because 
it suggests that the Court used a rational basis standard to hold the law 
unconstitutional rather than explicitly defining sexual orientation as a class 
warranting a heightened scrutiny standard.146 Because only a legitimate state 
interest is needed to uphold a law under a rational basis standard of review, 
Windsor’s holding suggests that bigamous marriages will gain legal recognition 
only when the government lacks a legitimate interest for denying legal 
recognition to the unions. 
Although it was clear in Windsor that no legitimate interest existed for the 
government to define marriage to exclude same-sex couples from the 
fundamental right to marry, the government likely will be able to deny legal 
recognition to bigamous unions if a rational basis standard is applied because 
of the impact bigamous marriage would have on tax and community property 
law.147 Though the decision in Windsor was significant in paving the way for 
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, it does not do enough to change 
the overall structural and systematic nature of marriage. In that regard, 
“Windsor does not represent the sort of wholesale shift in how intimate adult 
relationships are recognized under the law.”148 Because individuals in 
bigamous unions have not been identified explicitly as a suspect class 
warranting a strict scrutiny standard analysis by the Supreme Court, the 
government should be required to meet only a rational basis standard in 
denying these unions legal recognition. 
                                                                                                             
 143. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power 
to Enforce Equal Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 367, 385 (2014). 
 144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 821. 
 145. United States v. Windsor, 539 U.S. 2675, 2706 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”) (emphasis added). 
 147. Faucon, supra note 54, at 513–14; see also discussion infra Part. III.B. 
 148. Id. at 514. 
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b. Analysis Under Due Process 
Bigamy also could obtain legal recognition through a strict scrutiny 
analysis in light of the fundamental right to privacy recognized in 
Lawrence.149 Though Justice Kennedy used broad language in Lawrence’s 
majority opinion in the sense that he declined to recognize a specific scrutiny 
standard for his analysis,150 the holding nevertheless is insufficient for the 
legal recognition of bigamy. The Lawrence decision focused on the right to 
be free, or “left alone,” from governmental interference in one’s private and 
intimate affairs.151 Although Lawrence certainly was concerned with the 
liberty interests granted to individuals under due process, the opinion focused 
more on an individual’s freedom from governmental intrusion152 as opposed 
to an individual’s right of access to government institutions like marriage.153 
This distinction, in the context of bigamous marriage, highlights the contrast 
between “positive” and “negative” rights long recognized in constitutional 
law.154 The concepts of “positive” and “negative” rights, explained by Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Obergefell, suggests that although individuals have the 
right to be free from government intrusion in their private affairs,155 it does 
not follow that this principle also requires the government to recognize 
bigamy as a form of marriage.156 The holding in Lawrence is insufficiently 
broad to grant the legal recognition of bigamous marriage because the 
decision focused more on the fundamental right to privacy rather than the right 
to marry.157  
The notion that Lawrence is insufficient for the legalization of bigamous 
unions may be weakened by an argument focused on the reasoning from both 
Lawrence and Griswold. The concept of an individual’s “zone of privacy” 
recognized in Griswold158 may be expansive enough to warrant the legal 
recognition of bigamous marriage when paired with the broad affirmation of 
the right to privacy in Lawrence. An argument, however, that the broad 
privacy interests recognized in Griswold should warrant the legal recognition 
                                                                                                             
 149. See, e.g., id. at 497. 
 150. See supra note 122. 
 151. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 881. 
 152. Id. at 882. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
2271, 2283 (1990). 
 155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 577. 
 156. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2635 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of bigamous marriage is insufficient because Griswold focused only on 
the privacy interests attached to marriage rather than the idea of expanding 
the legal scope of what marriage as an institution entails.159 Thus, for 
bigamous marriage to warrant strict scrutiny analysis—which likely would 
grant bigamy legal recognition160—such an outcome would need to result 
from a judicial analysis under the broad liberty interests associated with 
the right to marry.161 For a judicial analysis of bigamy under due process, 
a strict scrutiny standard should apply only if the purported right to 
bigamous marriage is determined to fall within the contours of the broader 
fundamental right to marry.  
The answer to the question of whether bigamous unions should be 
granted legal recognition likely will turn on how the court frames the 
purported right. For example, if the purported right is framed as a “right to 
bigamous marriage,” it likely will fail the traditional fundamental rights 
analysis because bigamous marriage is unlikely to be recognized as a 
practice deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition.162 The analysis changes, 
however, if the issue is framed as whether the right to marry more than 
one person is “nothing but a subset of the more general right to marry.”163 
The framing of the right at issue is central to the confusion regarding the 
interplay between due process and equal protection, a problem further 
exacerbated by Obergefell. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell applied 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning from the majority opinion to raise the central 
question of the bigamy debate: whether the reasons for why marriage is 
crucial to society are equally applicable to individuals in bigamous unions, 
just as they were for same-sex couples.164 Regarding Justice Kennedy’s 
test in Obergefell,165 it is reasonable to conclude that its first principle, that 
the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of 
individual autonomy, is equally applicable to individuals in bigamous 
unions.166 No adequate reason exists to suggest that the personal choices 
involved with marriage are any more meaningful for persons in monogamous 
unions, or that individuals in bigamous unions cannot express the same 
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intimacy to their partners that individuals in monogamous unions share with 
each other. The majority also justified its test by arguing that the right to marry 
safeguards children and families167 and that marriage is a keystone of social 
order.168 These reasons are difficult concepts to apply to bigamous marriage; 
relevant data suggests that bigamous marriage in fact would be harmful to 
both women and children,169 and legalizing bigamous marriage likely would 
upset social order because of its potential to disrupt the majority of United 
States marriage laws.170 
The analysis under Justice Kennedy’s test becomes more problematic 
with the additional principle set forth in Obergefell: Justice Kennedy argued 
that the right to marry is fundamental because “it supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”171 Although 
this principle certainly applies to same-sex couples, proponents of bigamous 
marriage likely will be unable to apply this same principle equally to 
bigamous unions because of the obvious fact that they consist of more than 
two individuals. Chief Justice Roberts, however, criticized the majority 
opinion for this argument, suggesting that its reasoning could be extended 
to plural marriage—despite, in his view, Justice Kennedy’s “random[]” 
insertion of the phrase “two-person union.”172  
Justice Kennedy should have conducted his analysis under the 
traditional fundamental rights approach used by the Court in past decisions 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Court consistently 
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has held the right to marry as fundamental under the scope of this test,173 
Justice Kennedy should have analyzed whether same-sex couples were 
seeking access to this same right or a different right altogether. In Obergefell, 
same-sex couples sought access to the same right enjoyed by heterosexual 
couples; in other words, the fundamental right to marry applied to same-sex 
couples in the same manner in which it applied to heterosexual couples 
because they were “similarly situated” to the right to marry.174 This “similarly 
situated” language speaks to the delicate tension and overlap between due 
process and equal protection that the Court unfortunately failed to articulate 
in Obergefell.175 
In a companion case to Windsor, the district court’s majority opinion 
alluded to the overlap between due process and equal protection when it held 
that a law prohibiting same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under both the 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause.176 The majority’s analysis 
argued that the defining characteristics of marriage do not involve the race, 
gender, or sexual orientation of the individuals seeking to join in 
marriage177—a concept previously supported by the Court in Loving.178 
Instead, the court opined that marriage should be defined by the fidelity 
displayed between the consenting and committed individuals joining together 
in union;179 thus, the court concluded that a law banning same-sex marriage 
could not be upheld because the right to marry applied equally to same-sex 
couples as it did for opposite-sex couples.180 In contrast, plural relationships 
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inherently are defined by inequality.181 The promise of fidelity in 
monogamous marriage encourages spouses to devote themselves to each 
other unconditionally and entirely. The parties to a bigamous marriage, 
however, may owe to each other different levels of commitment entirely, 
especially if one of the parties to the union is married to only one individual 
while the other party is married to several. Although Justice Kennedy’s analysis 
in Obergefell was ambiguous and ignored the traditional fundamental rights 
analysis of the Court, the ultimate conclusion reached was doctrinally sound. If 
race no longer bars individuals from seeking to enjoy the right to marry after 
Loving,182 then neither should sexual orientation. 
Although Justice Kennedy hinted at these “core functions” of marriage in 
his explanation of why the right to marry applied to same-sex couples,183 he did 
so using an obscure and unprecedented analysis. Furthermore, he declined to 
specify the scrutiny standard used and, instead, vaguely stated that the law at 
issue violated both equal protection and due process,184 exacerbating the 
confusion as to how courts should interpret new rights in future decisions. 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s approach creates a dangerous precedent for 
Supreme Court analysis. By ignoring the traditional fundamental rights 
approach of prior Supreme Court decisions, justices of the Court create 
possibilities for future justices to supply their own beliefs and morals instead 
of a proper constitutional analysis. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
should conclude that under the traditional fundamental rights approach, the 
holding in Obergefell should not result in the recognition of bigamous 
marriage as a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny because 
individuals in bigamous unions are not “similarly situated” to the right to 
marry as are same-sex couples.185 
B. Identifying a Justifiable Governmental Interest 
This Comment next addresses whether a narrowly tailored governmental 
interest exists for a state that declines to recognize bigamous unions as a legal 
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form of marriage. The two major areas considered under this analysis are 
the potential conflicts between the legalization of bigamous unions and the 
areas of tax and community property law in the United States.186 
1. The Conflict with Tax Law 
Not only is United States tax law one of the most complex areas of 
law within the American legal system,187 it is also a body of law that 
largely has been ignored by scholars in the bigamous marriage debate.188 
Specifically, much of the legal scholarship debating the constitutionality 
of bigamous marriage overlooks the question of how this practice could 
coexist legally with current American law, such as tax law, which treats 
married and unmarried individuals differently in several respects.189 
A significant distinction that tax law makes between married and 
unmarried taxpayers is the difference in applied tax rates.190 For example, 
married couples can file and pay their taxes as a unified or joint taxpayer 
and thus have different rates applied to them than the rates that apply to 
unmarried taxpayers.191 This distinction is important to the bigamous 
marriage debate because “while the current tax rates could accommodate 
same-sex couples without any substantive changes, applying the current tax 
brackets to polygamous taxpayers would have absurd and often unjust 
results.”192  
The legalization of bigamous marriage would pose a unique and significant 
challenge to American tax law that was not present in the constitutional debate 
of same-sex marriage.193 In same-sex unions, the dyadic nature of “traditional” 
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marriage is maintained because there is no quantitative distinction present. 
Same-sex relationships, at least those similar to the relationships represented 
in Obergefell, still are unions between two equally consenting individuals.194 
The only difference between same-sex and heterosexual unions is the sexual 
orientation of the partners involved. Bigamous unions, however, are 
relationships that are without limit as to the number of individuals who can 
form and participate in the relationship. This fact seriously complicates 
American tax law because the tax filing system is designed to treat married 
persons as an economic unit consisting of only two individuals.195 
An additional problem with incorporating bigamous marriage into the 
current tax law concerns the significant lack of predictability concerning 
plural unions and the various forms they can take.196 One scholar illustrates 
this problem when she explains that although asymmetric and group marriage 
probably would cover a significant fraction of the actual arrangements people 
might desire, they would not exhaust the possibilities.197 Although the idea of 
creating a new tax system designed to apply a standard tax rate to marriages 
consisting of more than two individuals may be possible theoretically,198 the 
issue lies in designing a tax system capable of applying rates to marriages 
varying wildly in both form and number. 
Conceivably, any government can solve this problem by creating a tax 
system to apply a standard rate to all bigamous marriages, no matter the 
number of partners involved.199 The level of complexity with incorporating 
bigamous unions into the current tax filing system, however, demands an 
equally complex solution. Though providing an individualized tax system 
tailored to each family would create the fairest system, “doing so would add 
unnecessary complexity to the tax law and would be virtually un-
administrable.”200 Even assuming that the government can create a tax filing 
system that sufficiently addresses the problems that legal incorporation of 
bigamous unions would present, “Congress would need to make significant, 
complex changes to joint filing . . . [that] may be difficult, if not impossible, 
to design and implement.”201 Because of the significant complexities with 
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meeting such a high administrative burden, the government could provide 
efficiency reasons for refusing to recognize polygamous marriages legally.202 
2. The Conflict with Community Property Law 
The granting of legal recognition to bigamous unions poses significant 
conflicts for the process of terminating marriage, a problem that is highlighted 
when analyzed within the context of community property law. Community 
property states follow the rule that all assets and earnings acquired during the 
existence of the marriage are owned equally by both spouses.203 This concept 
raises complex questions concerning how bigamous marriages could coexist 
legally in a state that recognizes community property law, such as Louisiana.  
The assumption in the majority of community property states is to divide 
the assets equally upon dissolution of the marriage,204 but this process would 
become “drastically complicated in polygamous marriages, especially when 
one wife may leave the family unit behind or when the husband dies, leaving 
all of his wives to ‘split’ the pie.”205 The legalization of bigamous marriage 
would raise serious concerns in regards to the termination stage of marriage 
because whether by death or divorce, all marriages terminate at some point and 
the law must have an appropriate mechanism to address this end.206 The 
conundrum of how community property law would be able to partition property 
in bigamous marriages is problematic because “it is not at all obvious how best 
to understand, classify, and divide the community property of a person with 
more than one spouse at a time, as must be done at death or divorce.”207 
Similar to the potential conflict between bigamous marriage and current tax 
law, the widely varying forms of bigamous unions also pose a concern for 
community property states.208 For example, community property law could 
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incorporate bigamous unions that consist only of separate, two-person unions 
because, although all the partners may live together in one household, they 
nevertheless are married legally to only one other individual. This fact 
changes, however, in a bigamous union that desires to be recognized as one 
family or “community.”209 A simple solution to this potential issue would be 
to require all individuals in bigamous marriages to form their families as a 
series of two-person couples. This solution is insufficient, however, because 
some bigamous families may consist of an odd number of individuals. 
Additionally, it seems unjust to have a law mandating how bigamous families 
should form their relationships because “the decision to add a spouse 
implicates an individual’s freedom of intimate association.”210 
IV. PROPOSING A DOCTRINAL SOLUTION 
Because of the recent confusion regarding due process and equal 
protection, courts no longer have a clear standard to follow when determining 
whether a new fundamental right exists. The Louisiana Supreme Court, if 
presented with the issue of bigamous marriage, should confront the tension 
between equal protection and due process under both the Louisiana and 
United States constitutions to guide the state legislature in its enactment of 
future laws regarding bigamy and to influence the legal opinions concerning 
this issue on a larger scale. 
In terms of Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute,211 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court should rule unconstitutional the law that criminalizes 
bigamous unions because of the right to privacy recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Lawrence.212 Although Lawrence might be an insufficient 
basis for this proposition because its holding only concerned laws prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy,213 the Louisiana Supreme Court nevertheless should rule 
the criminal aspect of the statute unconstitutional given the heightened standard 
of privacy mandated by the Louisiana constitution.214 This facet of 
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Louisiana’s criminal bigamy statute should be ruled unconstitutional on the 
same grounds as the statute at issue in Lawrence: the statute invades an area 
of constitutionally-protected privacy by prohibiting consensual, private, non-
commercial acts of sexual intimacy.215 
Laws criminalizing the practice of bigamy also should be struck down 
because they do not exist to protect against coercion, injury, or public harm.216 
Opponents of bigamy have argued that this practice is harmful and abusive to 
women, often referencing the history of this practice in Muslim countries to 
bolster their argument.217 Numerous other studies, however, reveal that 
although these concerns are valid, little evidence exists to show that these 
same concerns are equally present in the United States.218 Moreover, even 
though there always exists a concern that abuse will occur in traditional 
monogamous relationships, it does not follow that this potential harm justifies 
governmental interference.219 As long as valid consent exists between 
individuals in bigamous unions, the individuals in those unions should be able 
to define their relationship in whatever manner they choose without fear of 
criminal punishment. The criminal nature of Louisiana’s bigamy statute 
cannot be justified because the legislation lacks a compelling interest to justify 
its effect of intruding upon private and intimate activity between consenting 
individuals. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court should invalidate the 
criminal aspect of the bigamy statute as unconstitutional for failing to pass 
strict scrutiny. 
A potential obstacle to this approach, however, is whether the Louisiana 
Legislature actually will remove the criminal aspect of its bigamy statute even 
if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to rule it unconstitutional. Despite the 
ruling in Obergefell, statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage in Louisiana have 
yet to be repealed.220 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court lacks the ability 
to legislatively modify the bigamy statute, it does have the power to strike part 
of the law down as unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution. By 
removing the criminal aspect of the Louisiana bigamy statute the Louisiana 
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Supreme Court can create the necessary pressure to “force the hand” of the 
legislature to reform the statute. Moreover, even if the legislature declines to 
reform the statute, a ruling invalidating the criminal aspect of the statute will 
allow individuals in bigamous unions the protection they need to sue the 
government if criminal charges were brought against them. 
After striking down the criminal aspect of Louisiana’s bigamy statute, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court next should confront whether bigamous unions 
should be granted legal recognition. Because the statute raises two separate 
questions, the court can apply a different level of scrutiny to this second 
issue.221 Thus, after striking down the criminal aspect of the bigamy statute, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court should decline to legally recognize the practice 
of bigamous unions under a rational basis analysis. 
In its analysis of “framing”222 the purported right at issue, the court 
should analyze whether the practice of bigamy falls under the constitutionally 
recognized right to marry while relying on United States Supreme Court 
precedent.223 Although Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell describing 
the right to marry as a “two-person union”224 suggests that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court justifiably can decline legal recognition to bigamous unions 
on this basis alone, the court nevertheless should focus on the traditional 
fundamental rights test to reach this conclusion. By doing so, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court can reach a conclusive result while simultaneously adhering 
to United States Supreme Court precedent—an approach that Justice Kennedy 
unfortunately declined to follow in Obergefell.225 
Through the traditional fundamental rights approach, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court should articulate that, unlike same-sex couples, individuals in 
bigamous unions seek a right different from the right to marry previously 
recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental to the nation’s history and 
tradition.226 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should determine that under 
a rational basis standard, the potential destabilizing effect that the legalization 
of bigamous unions would have on Louisiana’s governmental institutions—
especially Louisiana’s tax-filing administration and community property 
regime—is a legitimate interest in denying these unions legal recognition. In 
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this way, the court can provide a solution to both of the central issues raised 
by the statute. By denying legal recognition to bigamous unions, the court will 
safeguard the protection of Louisiana’s governmental institutions and 
preserve the state’s ability to regulate marriage. Additionally, the court will 
ensure that consenting individuals in bigamous unions will be able to define 
their relationships in the manner they desire without the fear of the state 
violating their privacy through criminal punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
The constitutional question of legalizing bigamous unions is a significant 
and complex issue that likely will require an equally complex solution. 
Although the overlap between due process and equal protection has become 
increasingly ambiguous and difficult to apply in the realm of individual rights, 
the tension between these two doctrines highlights the need for a court to 
provide clarity to this muddled area of precedent. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court, if confronted with these issues, should analyze the question of 
bigamous marriage through the traditional fundamental rights framework 
previously applied by the United States Supreme Court. By taking the 
initiative in addressing the question of bigamous marriage, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court can not only properly define the parameters of the state’s 
ability to regulate its most important governmental institutions but also can 
safeguard the privacy rights of its citizens. 
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